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1.0 Introduction 
 
Regulations relating to disease management have traditionally been an important 
component of the overall environment in which international trade in agriculture 
products occurs.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) allows members to restrict or 
prohibit imports from a country when imported products present a risk to human, animal 
or plant health or life.  As the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE, also commonly 
called Mad Cow disease in the media) outbreak in Canada showed, the disease status 
of a country is a major competitive advantage and losing disease-free status can 
impose significant costs on an industry.  The risks associated with SPS-based border 
closures were not well anticipated by the Canadian industry and government, and little 
was done in preparation for the potential change in the trading environment and the 
ensuing losses.  This is a mistake many stakeholders in the industry plan to avoid 




One possible option for reducing the costs associated with losing the freedom to 
export is to create internationally recognized sub-national zones with differing disease 
status within a country.  In international trade law, this practice is known as 
regionalization.  Traditionally, regionalization has been used as a disease management 
tool by veterinarians/plant scientists and has not been used to facilitate international 
trade.  However, when the SPS Agreement was negotiated, the possibility of allowing 
exports from regions that could be considered disease-free or having a lower incidence 
of disease was included as “Article 6 – Regionalization”.   
 
3.0  Benefits and Costs of Regionalization 
 
Regionalization was included in the SPS Agreement because of its potential 
economic benefits.  When a trade embargo or restriction is put in place because of a 
disease outbreak in the exporting country, the welfare gains from trade are eliminated or 
reduced.  If an exporting country can segregate the disease to a particular region or 
regions and maintain exports from the disease-free area(s), these losses can be 
reduced.  This is particularly relevant for geographically large countries which are export 
oriented such as Canada.  One of the most important issues that requires better 
designed policy responses, however, is that segregation of disease-free areas and 
infected areas will create a price differential between the regions; the price in the 
disease-free area will be higher than in the infected area. This creates an incentive to 
smuggle product from the infected area to the disease-free area.  Economic studies 
show that if there is an incentive to smuggle, it is almost impossible to completely 
eliminate.  Given the highly contagious nature of many of the diseases that countries 
are trying to manage, such as avian flu or foot and mouth disease (FMD), even one 
infected animal being smuggled could spread the disease to the previously disease-free 
area and efforts to implement a regionalization strategy will be rendered useless.  Thus, 
it is of critical importance to eliminate the incentive to smuggle which has largely been   2
unaddressed thus far. As discussed later, this could be accomplished through a well 
designed compensation policy.  
 
In Canada, the benefits of regionalization have been estimated to be as high as 
$20 billion in the event of a large scale FMD outbreak.  There are many costs 
associated with regionalization systems such as implementation and monitoring costs, 
efficiency losses from domestic trade restrictions and compensation costs to producers 
in the infected area.  Benefits are maximized and costs minimized when the infected 
region is as small as possible.  Hence, creating zones that minimize the area impacted 
should be a priority.  Existing administrative boundaries (such as provincial borders) are 
unlikely to coincide with economically optimal disease management areas.  The overall 
net benefit or loss from regionalization will depend on the nature and location of a 
disease outbreak and the subsequent size of the infected area.  Significant overall 
benefits may be possible but are not guaranteed. 
 
4.0  Regionalization and the WTO 
 
While the potential for regional exports was included in the SPS in 1995, 
widespread application of the principle has not been easily achieved as countries 
struggle to balance obtaining the benefits of increased trade with reducing the 
associated risks.  As a result, importing countries frequently fail to recognize exporting 
countries’ sub-national disease-free areas. 
 
Implementation of Article 6 was first identified as a major issue requiring further 
work in 1999 and it has been an agenda item at every meeting of the SPS Committee 
since 2003.  There has been little progress made since that time.  The main complaint 
has been the difficulty exporting countries have had when trying to obtain recognition for 
disease-free regions from importing countries.  Administrative procedures have been 
identified as the most significant impediment.  An important question to ponder is: If 
importing countries are willing to accept an exporting country’s assertion of disease-free 
status on a national basis, why are they unwilling to accept it on a sub-national basis?  
The answer to that may be the incentives to smuggle that were mentioned above. 
 
Negotiations at the WTO SPS Committee have focused on the possible creation 
of guidelines governing the administrative procedures that have been identified as a 
major impediment.  Many countries, most notably the South American countries, are 
strongly advocating that these administrative guidelines be created in the SPS 
Committee.  Other countries, most notably Canada, the US and Japan, argue they 
should be created at the relevant scientific standards setting bodies (the International 
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant diseases and the World Animal Health 
Organization (known by the acronym OIE from its original name, Office International des 
Epizooties) for animal diseases).  Despite three years of discussing the issue, no 
progress in improving implementation of the regionalization article has been made.   
Recent amendments to OIE regionalization standards failed to address the concerns 
raised at the SPS Committee regarding lack of transparency and predictability.   
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5.0 Canada’s  Experience  with  Regionalization 
 
Canada has recognized various countries’ efforts to create disease-free areas.  
This has applied primarily to the US and Mexico with respect to diseases such as 
anaplasmosis brucellosis, bluetongue, avian flu, pseudorabies and classical swine 
fever.  This is an important show of goodwill when Canada makes requests of others to 
recognize domestic regionalization efforts.  There are cases, however, in which 
countries have complained they have not obtained recognition when they should, such 
as Argentina’s FMD free region which is officially recognized by the OIE but not 
recognized by Canada. 
 
Canadian efforts at creating a regionalization system that could be implemented 
in the event of a major disease outbreak have focused primarily on the possibility of an 
incursion of FMD due to the devastatingly high costs that would result from an outbreak.  
These efforts fall mostly under the purview of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
(CFIA) and were initiated in 2000.  The CFIA has worked in conjunction with industry to 
identify major deficiencies in their existing scientific systems and in the examination of 
effective systems.  The CFIA would use regionalization as a “fallback” strategy, 
preferring to eliminate the disease on a national basis and implementing regionalization 
only if that is not feasible.  They are also following a post-outbreak strategy and would 
implement controls only after a disease was detected to avoid impeding domestic trade 
before it is necessary.   
 
Currently, the CFIA plan focuses on controlling domestic animal movements.   
Efforts have focused almost entirely on a crossing at the Manitoba-Ontario border that 
sub-divides Canada into two extremely large regions. The strategy is based on the ease 
of controlling animal movements rather than removing the economic incentive to 
smuggle. Significant potential net benefits from having smaller infected zones may be 
sacrificed. 
 
6.0 Advice  for  Implementing  Regionalization in Canada 
 
The most important issue that needs to be dealt with is eliminating the incentive 
to smuggle.  A compensation program must be designed ex ante and communicated to 
industry to avoid premature movement of animals in the event of a rumored outbreak 
and to control smuggling during the entire outbreak.  Without this, any efforts to create 
sub-national zones could be wasted. Policy makers should avoid creating zones based 
only on administratively convenient borders or enforcement efforts and should focus on 
containing the disease to the smallest geographical area possible.   
 
Second, Canada must be aware of the implications of attempting to implement 
regionalization on a post-outbreak basis.  This may be the optimal choice given 
Canada’s current disease status.  It will take time, however, to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the regionalization systems to trading partners after it is implemented.  
Policy makers must be aware of this and ensure a proper plan is in place for this 
transitory period.   4
Finally, at the WTO SPS Committee, Canada should consider altering its 
negotiating position.  As the significant delays in regaining access to the US market for 
live cattle exports after the BSE outbreak shows, administrative delays can be a serious 
issue and better rules would favour a heavily export dependent country such as 
Canada.  Canada should ensure these rules are fair, transparent, predictable and 
decided in a timely fashion while still allowing countries to accept imports only when the 
risk is acceptably low.  Explicitly including the issue of economic incentives to smuggle 
may be critical to breaking the stalemate that has existed for the past three years in the 




Many countries, including Canada, stand to benefit considerably from sub-
national zones that are allowed to export in the event of a major disease incursion.  
Work in the last six years has advanced Canada’s knowledge of what needs to be done 
but there are still major deficiencies in these plans.  Addressing economic incentives is 
one of the most important issues if implementation is to be successful; e.g. by using 
policies to equalize prices between sub-national regions.  Canada needs to develop a 
strategy for international negotiations that is built on the assumption that the country 
could experience another major disease outbreak.  A central component of this strategy 
is resolving the ongoing negotiations in a timely manner.  Finally, government agencies 
need to ensure that they design regionalization programs that are feasible for industry to 
implement and to continue working with industry to obtain their input and gain support 
for initiatives in this area. 
 